



Better Collective A/S

Remuneration policy

CVR no. 27 65 29 13



1. Introduction

1.1 This document constitutes the general policy (the “**Remuneration Policy**”) as approved by the general meeting of Better Collective A/S (the “**Company**”) for remuneration offered to members of the Board of Directors and the Executive Management of the Company. The Remuneration Policy replaces the Remuneration Policy as adopted by the Annual General Meeting on April ~~25~~~~22~~~~, 2023~~ 2024. An overview of material amendments to the Remuneration Policy is included as Annex A, which serves as an integral part of this Remuneration Policy.

The Executive Management includes executives in the Company registered as such with the Danish Business Authority (in Danish: *Erhvervsstyrelsen*).

1.2 Pursuant to section 139 and 139a of the Danish Companies Act, the Board of Directors of a Danish company admitted to trading on an EU regulated market must adopt a Remuneration Policy for the Board of Directors and the Executive Management. Such policy shall be approved by the Company’s shareholders at a General Meeting.

1.3 Agreements about remuneration for members of the Board of Directors or Executive Management entered into before the adoption of this policy will continue on already agreed terms. Any amendment of existing agreements as well as conclusion of new agreements with the members of the Board of Directors or the Executive Management are subject to the below policy and may at the earliest be entered into on the day after the approved Remuneration Policy has been published on the Company’s website.

2. Underlying principles and correlation between remuneration and long-term interests, business strategy and sustainability

2.1 The overall objective of the Remuneration Policy of Better Collective is to attract, motivate and retain qualified members of the Board and the Executive Management as well as to align the interests of the Board and the Executive Management with the interests of the Company’s shareholders and other stakeholders. The remuneration of the Board and the Executive Management shall be designed to support the strategic goals of Better Collective and to promote value creation for the benefit of the shareholders of Better Collective.

2.2 The Remuneration Policy contributes to and supports the company’s business strategy as well as long-term interests through different mechanisms. The short-term incentive program (the “**STI**”), which is a cash-based bonus scheme for the Executive Management, applies performance criteria (the “**KPIs**”) and associated financial and non-financial goals for one year at a time. ~~The KPIs are typically, but not necessarily, directly linked to the financial targets communicated to the market. The Board of Directors will review and adjust these annually to reflect any changes in strategy and the Company’s situation.~~ criteria that apply for the KPIs are determined taking into account Better Collective’s strategy, sustainability, long-term goals, and value creation. Following the end of a financial year, the Board of Directors will assess performance against the relevant KPIs based on reliable data sources such as audited or reviewed financial figures, internal assessments/reviews and/or reports prepared on the basis of generally accepted methods. KPIs may be linked to the financial performance of Better Collective such as organic growth, operating profit (EBIT), revenue growth, earnings per share, free cash flow as well as non-financial matters relating to Better Collective’s sustainability targets and ambitions.

2.3 The Board of Directors will review the KPIs and adjust these annually to reflect any changes in strategy and the Company’s situation.

~~2.3~~2.4 The long-term incentive program (the “**LTI**”), which is a share-based incentive scheme, seeks to secure the Executive Management’s incentive to safeguard the Company’s long-term interests. The fact, see paragraph



4.5 below, that the share-based incentive has a minimum 3-year vesting period and that the vesting of share based instruments may be subject to fulfillment of certain financial vesting targets ensures that the Executive Management are continuously exposed to the share price development for up to a 5-year horizon. The combination and distribution between the STI and the LTI thus seeks to ensure a balance between short-term and long-term results to the benefit of the Company, its shareholders and other stakeholders.

2.4

2.5 The Remuneration Policy ensures a correlation between Executive Management remuneration and long-term value creation which is in the interest of shareholders as it strengthens the sustainability of Better Collective's business model. The LTIP's financial improvement incentive and retention element both contribute to long-term value creation and sustainability in the company. [Grants under the LTI may also be subject to satisfactory performance as measured by one or more KPIs as described in paragraph 2.2.](#)

~~business model. The LTIP's financial improvement incentive and retention element both contribute to long-term value creation and sustainability in the company.~~

2.6 The remuneration and other relevant terms of employment of Better Collective's employees have been taken into consideration in the preparation of this Remuneration Policy. The remuneration of Better Collective's employees is based on the following principles:

- Remuneration is based on local conditions in the markets where Better Collective operates
- Remuneration principles and structure apply to all employees irrespective of their geographic location, but the actual remuneration depends on local market conditions and may therefore vary by country
- To ensure transparency in performance-related pay, KPIs are used, primarily growth and the profitable development of Better Collective's business
- To ensure that key employees focus on the long-term interests of the shareholders, share-based incentive plans are related to business performance or improved share price performance

3. Remuneration of the Board

3.1 The members of the Board are up for election every year. Re-election is possible. The members of the Board are remunerated with fixed annual fees approved by the General Meeting. All members of the Board receive an annual base fee which shall be in line with market practice of comparable listed companies taking into account the required competencies, effort and scope of work of the members of the Board. The Chairman of the Board receives 3 times the annual base fee for their extended duties. The Vice Chairman of the Board receives 2 times the annual base fee for their extended duties. All members of the Board, who are also members of the committees established by the Board, receive an additional fixed fee as remuneration for their committee work. The Chairman of a committee receives 2 times the annual fixed fee for the committee. The size of the fixed committee fee depends on the competencies, effort and scope of work required by the members of each committee.

3.2 Members of the Board may be entitled to reasonable travel allowance and participation in relevant training. In the event a member of the Board takes on specific ad hoc tasks outside the scope of ordinary tasks of the Board in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Board, the member may be offered a fixed fee for the work carried out related to such tasks.

3.3 No retention or severance schemes apply for the Company's board members.



3.4 To remain competitive in the international market and to be able to attract and retain qualified members of the Board of Directors it is considered in the best interest of Better Collective and its shareholders to include the possibility to offer a share-based instrument to a new member/proposed candidate of the Board of Directors on a discretionary basis. A new member of the Board may be granted share-based instruments upon election given certain circumstances. The grant of share-based instruments to a new member of the Board of Directors is subject to approval by the Annual General Meeting. ~~To ensure the Board's independence and supervisory function, the Nomination Committee shall in its sole discretion determine whether or not to endorse a proposal for a grant of a share-based instrument to the proposed candidate for the Board of Directors, further vesting~~ Vesting of the share based instruments granted to such new members of the Board of Directors shall not be subject to fulfilment of forward-looking performance criteria.

4. Remuneration of the Executive Management

4.1 The Executive Management's terms of executive employment and remuneration are agreed between the individual executive and the Board. The total remuneration of the Executive Management may consist of the following fixed and variable remuneration components:

- (a) a fixed base salary including pension contributions (the "**Base Salary**")
- (b) variable remuneration consisting of STI (up to 100% of the Base Salary)
- (c) variable remuneration consisting of LTI (the relative share of LTI grants to the Base Salary is described in paragraph 4.5 below)
- ~~(e)~~(d) customary non-monetary executive employment benefits
- ~~(d)~~(e) termination and severance payment

The purpose of these remuneration components is to create a well-balanced remuneration package reflecting individual performance and responsibility of the members of the Executive Management in relation to established financial and non-financial targets and the Company's overall performance.

4.2 Base salary

The annual base salary is determined with a view to provide a competitive remuneration to attract and retain members of the Executive Management with the required professional and personal competences. The annual base salary for the members of the Executive Management shall be in line with market practice and based on the individual member's responsibilities and performance. The members of the Executive Management shall be entitled to customary non-monetary benefits as approved by the Board. The members of the Executive Management can also participate in the pension scheme of the Company, which for the Executive Management may amount to up to 16% of the fixed remuneration.

4.3 Variable remuneration

In addition to the annual base salary, the members of the Executive Management may receive variable remuneration which shall be based on the individual performance and responsibility of the members of the Executive Management in relation to established financial and non-financial targets, both in the short and the longer term, as well as the Company's overall performance. The Executive Management may, at the discretion of the Board, be entitled to participate in the following incentive schemes:

- (a) Cash bonus (STI)
- (b) Share-based incentive (LTI)

4.4 STI



Cash bonus schemes consist of an annual bonus, which the individual member of the Executive Management can receive if KPIs and associated financial and non-financial goals of the Company and other possible personal targets for the relevant year have been met. The maximum cash bonus shall be equivalent to 100 percent of the Base Salary of each eligible participant of the Executive Management. Payment of bonus is only relevant when KPIs have been fully or partly met (as determined by the Board of Directors). If no targets are met, no bonus is paid out. Targets for the Executive Management shall be agreed upon in advance by the Board of Directors and the Executive Management.

4.5 LTI

The LTI program shall be based on the issuance of share based instruments in the Company. Share based instruments granted under ~~a LTI program will vest annually over a period of minimum three years from the~~ an LTI program will vest annually over a period of minimum three years from the date of grant. Since grants made under the share-based incentive (LTI) are not necessarily made annually, it is not deemed relevant to apply an annual cap on the value of each grant. The Board of Directors has, however, determined that the value of a grant at the time of grant shall not exceed 100% of the recipient's Base Salary for the grant year and each of the preceding years until but excluding the most recent year in which a grant was made. For example, if a grant is made in 2025 and the most recent grant before that was made in 2022 (i.e. no grants were made to the recipient in 2024 and 2023) the grant size shall be limited to the recipient's total annual Base Salary in the calendar years 2023, 2024 and 2025. The Board of Directors may, based on a specific assessment, disregard a previous grant when determining the size of a new grant where the share based instruments under the previous grant cannot be exercised without paying an exercise price that is higher than the current trading price of the Company's shares (i.e. the relevant share based instruments are 'out of the money').

~~date of grant.~~ The targets for granting and/or vesting, if any, will be defined in advance by the Board of Directors. The targets may include financial and strategic targets of the Company as well as individual targets. If such targets have not been fully or partly met, vesting of the share based instruments will be reduced or lapse. It is a prerequisite for the Executive Management's vesting rights that their executive employment with the Company is not under notice or terminated for any reason by any party throughout the vesting period. This prerequisite may not apply in certain "good leaver" situations. ~~The board of directors may in advance of granting LTI to participants determine a cap on the total value of the LTI to the respective participants.~~

4.6 Termination and severance payment

The Executive Management will typically be employed without a time limit, but with the right to reciprocal termination. The Company may terminate with a notice of termination of 12 months, while the Executive Management member may give notice to the company of 6 to 9 months. The total value of remuneration to each member of the Executive Management regarding the notice period, including severance pay, cannot exceed two years remuneration including all remuneration components. In the event of the death of a member of the Executive Management, the company may pay what amounts to up to 6 to 12 months' remuneration to the Executive Management member's survivor.

4.7 Clawback

In the situation where bonus, share based instruments or other incentive remuneration have been provided to a member of the Executive Management on the basis of data or accounts which subsequently prove to have been misstated, the Company may reclaim the incentive remuneration in full or in part on the basis of such data.

4.8 Extraordinary remuneration

In connection with recruitment of members to the Executive Management and where the circumstances make it necessary, the Board of Directors may grant extraordinary remuneration, in each case subject to (i) the Board



of Directors finding that such extraordinary remuneration is supportive to the long-term interests of Better Collective and its shareholders and (ii) the Remuneration Committee's recommendation.

The value and form of such extraordinary remuneration shall be determined by the Board of Directors in its discretion, however, having due regard to any incentives in another company (and the value hereof) forfeited by the new member of the Executive Management upon his/her recruitment with Better Collective, and in each case for the purpose of aligning the interest of the new member of the Executive Management with the long-term interests of Better Collective and its shareholders.

The Board of Directors may further grant extraordinary remuneration to reward exceptional company and/or individual performance or to support retention of an individual where this is deemed appropriate in light of the actual circumstances.

5. **Indemnification**

On 22 April 2024, the general meeting adopted an indemnification scheme for members of the Board of Directors (the "Scheme"). On the terms and subject to the conditions of the Scheme, Better Collective shall indemnify and hold harmless a member of the Board of Directors, to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, from and against any losses incurred by such member of the Board of Directors arising out of any actual or potential claims, including any costs, expenses and potential tax liabilities associated therewith, raised by any third party (other than Better Collective group companies) against a member of the Board of Directors based on such member of the Board of Directors discharge of his/her duties as member of the Board of Directors. Any losses relating to liability incurred by a member of the Board of Directors arising out of such member's fraud, sanctioned offences under applicable criminal law or deliberate criminal acts, improper acts and omissions (in Danish "utilbørlige dispositioner"), wilful misconduct or, to the extent not indemnifiable under Danish law, gross negligence are excluded from indemnification under the Scheme. For the purpose of establishing an indemnification scheme for the Executive Management, the Board of Directors stipulates the terms and conditions applicable to such indemnification scheme.

6. **Remuneration Committee and procedures to avoid conflicts of interest**

The Board has established a remuneration committee (the "**Remuneration Committee**") to ensure that the Company maintains and observes a Remuneration Policy for the members of the Board and the Executive Management. The Remuneration Policy and any changes thereto shall be approved by the Board as well as the General Meeting. ~~Furthermore, the Nomination Committee, as appointed according to the instructions in the Company's Articles of Association and the Swedish Corporate Governance Code, shall prepare and propose the fees to the Board of Directors and any fees for committee work.~~ The Remuneration Committee shall evaluate and make recommendations for the remuneration of the members of the Board and the Executive Management. The Remuneration Committee shall retain its own advisers separate from the external advisers engaged by the Company and/or the Executive Management. To avoid conflicts of interest, the Remuneration Policy and the remuneration of the Board will be approved by the General Meeting, and the remuneration of the Executive Management will be approved by the Board. With respect to share components offered to proposed board candidates, such proposal is subject approval by the Company's general meeting ~~and further the proposal itself is subject to endorsement by the Nomination Committee.~~

7. **Deviations from the remuneration policy**

To achieve the overall objective of this Remuneration Policy, the Board of Directors may in special ~~circumstances deviate from this Policy if any part of the Policy no longer drives business performance, the achievement of the Company's strategy or employee motivation and retention. Any such deviation must be discussed in the Remuneration Committee who will provide a recommendation to the Board of Directors.~~ circumstances, based on valid criteria, that are objective and verifiable, agree to deviate from this Policy, when it is deemed in the long-term interest of Better Collective, its shareholders, or the sustainability



[of Better Collective.](#)

[The Board of Directors' discretionary right to deviate from the Remuneration Policy \(subject to the above procedures\) includes, but is not limited to, \(i\) size of grants, \(ii\) timing of grants, \(iii\) determination and assessment of grant and vesting conditions, including adjustment and assessments of KPIs and associated financial and non-financial goals, \(iv\) vesting of share-based instruments \(as applicable\), and/or \(v\) the treatment of share-based instruments \(as applicable\) in the case of resignations, change of control, merger or other corporate restructuring events, rights issues or other unforeseeable and/or extraordinary events.](#)

Any deviation from this Policy will be described and explained in the Company's Annual Report and/or Remuneration Report. A change to any strategic component of remuneration will be disclosed on the Company's Annual Report and /or the Company's Remuneration Report.

8. Approval and Publication of the Remuneration Policy

This Remuneration Policy has been reviewed and approved by the Remuneration Committee and the Board and this Remuneration Policy shall be posted on the Company's website (www.bettercollective.com) specifying the date of adoption by the General Meeting of the Company. This Remuneration Policy is applicable to remuneration programs with respect to the financial year ~~2023-2025~~ and subsequent financial years. The Remuneration Policy shall be described in the Company's annual report and the Chairman shall in connection with the report from the Board at the Annual General Meeting comment on the principles of the Remuneration Policy and compliance hereof. The Company will prepare a Remuneration Report in accordance with applicable law containing information on, inter alia total remuneration, for each of the Executive Management members and on an individual basis, and on compliance with the Remuneration Policy.

This Policy has been approved by the Board of Directors on ~~April 22, 2024~~ [25 March 2025](#) and by the General Meeting on [22 April 22, 2024](#) [2025](#).

9. Policy Review

The Remuneration Policy shall be reviewed by the Remuneration Committee at least on an annual basis.



Annex A – Overview of amendments to the Remuneration Policy

- Annual General Meeting held on 26 April 2022
 - The remuneration was amended to remove the share-based remuneration for the Board of Directors. The decision was based on the Company’s experiences with impracticalities around the arrangement.
- Annual General Meeting held on 25 April 2023
 - All references to “Warrants” replaced with “share based instruments”. As a consequence hereof, the requirement in section 4.5 with respect to the general meetings involvement in the issue of LTI has been removed. The amendment is due to the company’s recent incentive schemes being in the form of share options and/or performance share units.
 - ~~the~~ The cap on variable remuneration consisting of share-based incentives (LTI) is made optional for the board of directors when granting LTI to participants. The reason for this amendment is that the Company prefers not to grant LTIs annually, and thus, the cap is impractical; ~~and~~.
 - ~~references~~ References to “warrants” are replaced with “share based instruments”, which consequently includes removal of the requirement in section 4.5 with respect to the general meeting’s involvement in the issue of LTI. The reason for this amendment is that the Company recently has and expects going forward to use share options and/or performance share units instead of warrants as incentive schemes.
- Annual General Meeting held on 22 April 2024
 - The Remuneration Policy was amended in connection with the implementation of an indemnification scheme for members of the Board of Directors. Reference is made to section 5 of the Remuneration Policy.
- Annual General Meeting held on 22 April 2025
 - The Remuneration Policy was amended to define in further detail the KPIs used for STI and LTI grants and the method and practices for assessing performance against the KPIs.
 - The cap on the relative share of LTI grants to a recipient’s Base Salary has been reintroduced and described in further detail in paragraph 4.5.
 - The option of granting extraordinary remuneration for recruitment purposes (or where appropriate for retention purposes or to reward exceptional performance) has been included in a new paragraph 4.8, in each case provided that such extraordinary remuneration is in the interest of Better Collective and Better Collective’s shareholders.
 - Further details have been provided on the circumstances under which the Board of Directors may deviate from the Remuneration Policy and examples of deviations have been provided in paragraph 7.